into popular reactions, and the Scottish Office, whose officials were faced with implementing a scheme designed in London.
I
The scheme devised under Asquith between 1906 and 1908 and amended in parliament conferred a pension on men and women of seventy years who enjoyed British nationality and twenty years' residence. Payment was means-tested, beginning at 5s weekly where annual income did not exceed i72I (a little over 8s a week), decreasing by is stages to is where income did not exceed (3I ios a year (a little over I2s a week). In addition there were a number of disqualifications. Claimants could not receive poor relief and a pension simultaneously, though certain forms of relief such as medical assistance did not disqualify; and those who received poor relief from I January 1908 were temporarily excluded until December I9IO. A person also lost his claim for ten years if convicted and imprisoned, without option of a fine, for failing to work according to ability to maintain himself and his dependents, and for conviction and detention under the Inebriates Act after the age of sixty. Despite these restrictions, which in practice proved much less significant than they appear, some contemporaries condemned the scheme as highly subversive. In an intemperate outburst in parliament Lord Rosebery insisted: 'It is, of course, Socialism, pure and simple', and condemned the government for transferring responsibility from individuals to the state; Sir Michael Hicks Beach declared it wrong to give the elderly money without regard to their moral character; and Lord Wemyss claimed it would demoralize the working class and undermine the family. Even William Beveridge rejected the idea of a non-contributory pension as a change for the worse because it 'sets up the state in the eyes of the individual as a source of free gifts'. He refused to believe that even the poorest could not afford contributions: 'surely they waste more than twopence a week on drink, let them contribute that'.6 In his Lectures on law and opinion (I913) A. V. Dicey regretted the transition from individualism to collectivism since the i87os which entailed the subversion of local private, and voluntary action by centralized imposition. In fact, as Jose Harris rightly points out, Dicey overlooked the extent to which collectivism promoted individualism, and he failed to grasp that collective provision was often more acceptable.7 Not only did the pension enable many old people to avoid the poor law and live more independent lives, it also helped family members to stay together and support each other. 8 The failure of individualist criticism to deflect the scheme reflected the force of the counter-arguments. In August 1908 the provincial newspapers made great play with revelations about what the Bolton Evening News called 'Very Old Age Pensioners' involving state doles to civil servants, ambassadors, and ex-ministers 'on the grounds that they could not otherwise maintain themselves befittingly'.9 They cited Lord Cromer's 7900 pension, Sir Henry Drummond Woolf's CI,700, and put former Conservative ministers on the defensive by revealing that Henry Chaplin and Gerald Balfour received fI,200 and Lord Cross and Lord George Hamilton ?2,ooo. Liberal opinion also disputed the moral assumptions made by their opponents by arguing that 'so far from being destructive of thrift, we believe that the Act will actually promote it'. This was borne out by Lloyd George's decision to include a provision allowing a claimant to expunge the disqualification for failure to work by showing he had contributed to any friendly society, provident society, or trade union before the age of sixty.10 Moreover, the case for selfhelp had been severely undermined by the growing inadequacy of friendly societies. Never designed to deal with old age, they had been making payments on grounds of sickness and infirmity to people who were simply too old to work. As a result many societies faced insolvency by I900, but it was virtually impossible for prospective members to know which were safe to join. In any case many members let their membership lapse and lost their money.1 It is also very doubtful whether the state pensions can be fairly described as intrusive by comparison with the private schemes. Whereas a person who qualified for a pension received it as of right without the need to make further claims, members of friendly societies or sick and burial clubs were often subjected to supervision, inquisition, and even withdrawal of benefits if their behaviour fell short of the required standard.12 As we shall see, one of the features of the state scheme was the opportunity it gave pensioners to lead more independent lives.
II
Speaking in a parliamentary debate on pensions in June I908 Philip Snowden asked whether a workingman 'would submit to the inquisition which is prescribed by this Bill for the paltry sum of one shilling a week?'l3 However, his remarks missed their target. For a generation of men and women unfamiliar with bureaucracy, some of whom were illiterate, it was a natural assumption that the application for an old age pension would present a formidable obstacle. The system operated at four levels. First, claimants obtained forms from their local post office up to four months before reaching seventy. They could fill it up on the spot and leave it with the postmaster or take it away to complete privately. On 24 September 1908, the day on which forms first became available, the newspapers reported brisk business especially at sub-post offices, some of which had to call for extra copies. At Newcastle-upon-Tyne: At Bolton Post Office where several applicants arrived together, they were shown into the private room of the superintendent and offered chairs. The staff had been summoned and instructed on the need to show kindness and consideration to the 'veterans' especially as many were illiterate and unable to answer the questions quickly: 'No impatience should be shown but the utmost kindness should be extended, for in every case it should be remembered that you are dealing with somebody who has not had the educational facilities that you had.'15
The forms next went to the pension officers, officials of the Inland Revenue, who considered the details, sought extra information if necessary, and passed them on to the local pension committee with their recommendations.l1 These committees were appointed by county councils and county boroughs and usually divided into territorial sub-committees. Though they enjoyed the option of cooption, most councils seem to have restricted membership to the elected councillors and aldermen.17 The pension committee made the decision to grant a pension. However, it was open to pension officers to appeal against their decision to the Local Government Board which was the fourth part of the system.
In practice the majority of applicants came into direct contact with only the first of these institutions, a fact that proved to be crucial to the success and popularity of the scheme. Although state pensions were regarded by some as an extension of outdoor poor relief, the politicians and civil servants felt convinced that in order to reach those in real need the scheme must be kept separate from the poor law. Lloyd George told an aggrieved deputation from the Association of Poor Law Unions: 'the Government were most anxious to dissociate the pensions scheme from direct and official connection with Poor Law relief. Pride often prevented men who were suffering dire poverty from seeking the charity of the Poor Law."18 The Post Office proved to be an inspired choice. As early as the i87os reformers had identified it as an appropriate vehicle for pensions because it already operated the Savings Bank and a small-scale deferred annuities scheme.19 The existing network of 23,500 sub-post offices endowed the state with an economical means of operating the new policy and an institution familiar to the recipients and wholly respectable because it was used by all members of the community.2 Indeed, the only criticism voiced by the press was that the government had not given the Post Office enough control. According to the Liverpool Daily Post, confused old people 'have need of an interpreter such as can be found at every post office counter', and if less had been done by pension officers and more by the postal officials 'who know the poor personally and understand their ways, the public interest would have been better served'. deliberately cast as the pensioner's friend. Well in advance instructions went out to the effect that: 'It will be the duty of Postmasters and Sub-postmasters to give all necessary assistance in the filling up of the forms, and they should see that answers are given to all the questions.'25 Nor was their help given simply as a matter of duty or out of benevolence; they had a material interest too. Postmasters received remuneration for every pension order they handled just as they did for other categories of their work.26 But in addition they received is for every accepted claim they handled, in effect giving them a financial incentive to maximize successful applications.27 The importance of this system can hardly be exaggerated. It gave the applicants an expert friend who was often familiar with their personal circumstances and was able to shield them from the more impersonal bureaucratic elements. Pensioners had very limited contact with the other parts of the system. If a pension officer required further information he could visit the applicant; and a dissatisfied applicant was offered the chance to appear before the local pension committee and, if still refused, to appeal to the Local Government Board. Pensioners whose forms had not been dealt with in time for them to qualify as soon as they became seventy were reimbursed for the outstanding payments.28
Of all the obstacles facing the elderly claimants the most immediate was illiteracy. Signatures were required both on the original application and subsequently on encashment of the pensions orders. However, pensioners were permitted to make their mark instead in the presence of a postal clerk and a witness; the postmaster could act as witness even if not personally acquainted with the pensioner. Where a pensioner was too infirm or mentally ill to be able to sign for himself or attend the post office, payment was authorized to an agent a week at a time; to cover longer periods a doctor's signature was required to confirm that the pensioner was unable to attend personally.29 In I909 22 per cent of all pensions were collected by agents.30 Perhaps the most formidable complication lay in establishing an applicant's age, partly for lack of documentation and partly because many people simply had no idea how old they were. As a result of the civil registration of births since 1837 the younger pensioners could obtain certificates. Failing that, applicants produced certificates of marriage (which indicated that the partners were of 'full age'), their 'christening paper', letters of discharge from the armed forces, documents issued by friendly societies, and family Bibles in which details about 25 Where other sources failed, the pension officers resorted to the census for I84I and 1851 to verify age, especially in Scotland and Ireland. This aroused objections on the grounds that householders had given the information in confidence, that people might be tempted to mis-state their age in a future census, and that it imposed extra work on the officials.34 Yet some newspapers advised claimants that a birth certificate was not necessary because the officials would enquire at Somerset House on their behalf. As a result, by December i909 some 56,000 cases had been referred to the registrar general of which 38,000 had been identified; of these only 2,600 had been found to be ineligible because they were too young.35 But by 1911 access to the census had been restricted to cases involving an appeal to the Local Government Board because of the registrar's general's anxiety to reduce the workload.36 It was, however, accepted that the census had to be employed for difficult cases in Scotland where the 'Disruption' of I842-4, which led to the breakaway of the Free Church from the Church of Scotland, meant that many people living in the highland and island areas had never appeared in the parochial registers. Consequently the census returns were transferred from London to Edinburgh so that pension officers could resolve cases without going to an appeal.37 During I9I0 they conducted at least I,ooo searches each month, and a maximum of 6,600 in November, probably because the imminent abolition of the poor law disqualification had attracted additional applications. By 1913 the I86I census had also been opened to resolve Scottish cases. Meanwhile in London the local pension committee demanded access to the census for both I86I and 1871, and pressed the government to collect separate statistics for the elderly.38
By 1913 the number of appeals amounted to just 3-5 per cent of all claims for pensions. By this stage the calculation of an applicant's means, which proved complicated in some cases, constituted the largest single cause of appeals (see Table i ). The pension officers were required to take account of several assets including cash income, the use of property, income from property, maintenance, Five factors may be adduced to explain why the number of pensioners exceeded the estimates of the civil servants so greatly. The first involves the attitude adopted by the poor law boards.45 Many guardians were only too conscious that they would disqualify people from the pension inJanuary I909 by granting poor relief, and, moreover, had an obvious interest in reducing the numbers supported on the local rates. They therefore sought ways of helping without incurring the penalty. At Wolverhampton the clerk to the guardians pointed out that loans did not count as poor relief, an option sometimes adopted. At Prestwich the relieving officers advised the elderly to approach the Charity Organization Society to tide them over to the end of the year; and in Lincolnshire funds were raised privately to keep them off the rates until they qualified for pensions.46 From LondonJohn Burns reported to Asquith: 'I gather from Relieving Officers that a good number of aged poor who, in the absence of pensions must have become chargeable to the Poor Law, have kept themselves off and thus with some effort have qualified for
pensions. 47
A second explanation is that the local pension committees, who made most of the decisions, were inclined to generosity. An example from Carlisle suggests how this worked. The local committee received a recommendation from the pension officer to refuse the claim of a woman whose husband had received poor relief; We have already noted the role of post office employees in helping to maximize successful applications for pensions. In addition, evidence in the Post Office archives in connection with irregular payments suggests that some went further than this.52 Sub-postmasters were frequently warned against payments made more than three months after the date printed on the orders; clerks were supposed to write 'out-of-date' on these and initial them. Such cases probably arose after the death of a pensioner left a book full or orders in the hands of his relatives. Though relatives were allowed to cash orders up to the date of death, it seems clear that they often managed to extend the period.53 Also, thefts of pensions books led to the impersonation of pensioners and agents. Clerks were therefore warned repeatedly against making payments to representatives unless the certificate on the back of the order had been properly completed, and against accepting orders unless the pensioner's mark had been properly attested by the name and address of a witness. Another loophole arose when a pensioner moved and transferred to a different post office. In such cases a new book was issued, but sometimes the old one remained in use when it should have been cancelled and the stoppage recorded.54 All these irregularities were the subject of instructions issued continually from 1911 to I9I4.55 As the clerks must have been familiar with the system by this time, it seems unlikely that these occurred merely through inattention or misunderstanding on their part. It suggests a degree of collusion between the pensioners' relatives and the sub-postmasters who may have regarded a book of unused orders as a legitimate, if not strictly valid, means of helping needy families.
A further dimension to the inflation of the number of pensioners was Ireland. During the debates in I908 Lord Lansdowne had warned that lax administration in Ireland, owing partly to the absence of reliable evidence on birth dates, would result in profligate expenditure there. To some extent the evidence appears to corroborate his claims. Registration of births had not begun until I865 and the first official report on the Act in Ireland admitted that many applicants had no proof of age: 'In such cases we have to be guided to some extent by the reports of the Pension Officers or of our own inspectors after seeing the claimants. On the whole we believe the result has been that more borderline cases have been given the benefit of the doubt than have been excluded. '5 Additionally, assessment of the means of claimants in the south and west proved complicated because rent was a poor guide to the value of smallholdings and it was difficult to obtain a cash value for produce and stock. Confusion also arose because elderly people sometimes left their names in the rent books although they had handed over the land to their sons in return for maintenance which was not precisely defined. The officials believed that after i908 solicitors began amending rate and rent books to ensure that people were not rendered ineligible for the pension. pensions applied only to the very poor. By I9I4 no less than three-fifths of the entire population over seventy received them, making the scheme a much bigger step towards universal provision than has usually been recognized.83 Another indication of the diversity amongst pensioners is suggested by wartime experience when a number of them returned to normal work and stopped drawing pensions for a time. The rates were also increased in I916, 1917, and I919 to reflect the rising cost of food and rent.84 The I908 scheme differed too obviously from existing methods of treating the elderly to be regarded as another form of control from above. At the outset observers noticed that pensioners 'showed none of the cringing manner often exhibited by recipients of outdoor relief, but, while respectful, seemed rather imbued with the idea that they were entitled to the pension by right'.85 Moreover, the number of pensioners soon became too large to incorporate none but the wholly respectable. Some people evidently gave way to drink soon after acquiring their pension, but this did not render them liable to loss of pension unless they were convicted and detained under the Inebriates Act.86 The extent to which the reform fostered a new freedom for the elderly becomes clear from a consideration of the implications of pensions for the poor law system. During the autumn of I908 poor law boards and local pension committees made it clear that they resented having to deny pensions to elderly paupers, and they urged the Local Government Board to amend the scheme to allow them the choice of a transfer from the poor law to pensions.87 Guardians increasingly argued that it would be unfair to keep seventy-year-olds on outdoor relief, which averaged only 2s 6d a week, when they were now morally entitled to 5s. One Prestwich guardian 'did not like to think of any old person having to exist on less than 5/-per week'.88 Some boards decided to raise outdoor relief: 'where 5/-... would remove a person from the border of starvation to reasonably comfortable living it is not waste but justice to make the increase'.89 In effect the state pension was setting a new standard of maintenance for the poor.
The effect of these debates, combined with the sympathetic press reaction and the political parties' commitment to extending the scheme was to make state maintenance of the elderly a matter of consensus not controversy by I9I4. As three-fifths of all those aged over seventy had become pensioners they ceased to 83 See Macnicol and Blaikie, 'Politics of retirement', pp. 26-7; this is why during the war it was argued that the pension ought to be extended to all over seventy, as a mark of citizenship, regardless of need or class: Sir Thomas Oliver, Report, National Conference on Old Age Pensions, July I916, Enquiries made by Treasury officials in I908 to poor law unions at Cirencenster, Evesham, Wolverhampton, Walsall, and Bristol revealed that the officials expected only 5 or 6 per cent of inmates over seventy to be capable of surviving outside the workhouse on a pension.9l Many were physically incapable, mentally defective, or alcoholics. However, not all inmates were prepared to accept this; women especially argued that they would be able to supplement the pension by sewing, nursing, repairing boots, and making vegetable nets; and in I9IO medical officers in Scotland estimated that as many as 870 out of 3,110 inmates would be able to support themselves independently.92 Nationally indoor relief had fallen by almost a fifth among the elderly by I9I3. These figures conceal the fact that some people moved in and out of poor law institutions during this period. Since the law expressly allowed guardians to provide medical relief, pensioners could continue to draw their state benefits while in an infirmary or hospital, a situation which provoked criticism from politicians who felt that pensioners should not be maintained on the rates.93 Such critics were not appeased by the news that the authorities were entitled to recover the costs.94
On the other hand, some poor law inspectors and medical officers complained because they believed that more elderly people ought to return to institutional care. In the face of such pressure many elderly people clearly appreciated the measure of independence and freedom from officials that they had acquired through their pension. Though they entered hospital from time to time, they took care to retain their pension even though some politicians and officials regarded this as an abuse of the system. According to McKinnon Wood, pension officers often notified the inspectors informally about people requiring supervision and some tried to keep an eye on them. But, significantly, he stopped short of granting them any formal powers, for such an infringement of pensioners' newly won freedom would no doubt have been politically unacceptable. Even those pensioners who did feel obliged to enter the workhouse found a subtle alteration in their status, for during their stay the authorities were permitted to reimburse themselves for the costs of maintenance. As they paid for their care, pensioners in this position strictly ceased to be the objects of charity. The institutions found this troublesome because the person appointed to collect pensions on behalf of inmates often had to visit widely scattered post offices and do so twice weekly, first to obtain the necessary form and again to cash the order.99 Requests by poor law boards to be allowed access to the money in respect of unsigned orders were flatly refused.1?? However, if orders had not been cashed before a person left the institution, the authorities were unable to obtain costs. Some pensioners proved un-cooperative, refusing to sign the orders, either because they were incapable or because they stubbornly refused to hand over what they saw as their money. In effect, they were asserting their right to an independent [pensions] become in the constituency that it appears to dwarf all others, and there is hardly a meeting at which the Unionist candidate is not compelled to refer to it ... in the strongest possible terms. '12 The party organizers advised Balfour that pensions had damaged them especially in rural constituencies, and that Lansdowne's blunder did 'not make our task easier in counteracting the lying accusations'.13 Though less prominent in the December general election pensions remained highly relevant due to the influx of new pensioners inJanuary. In both elections the Liberals enjoyed indirect benefits from the stimulating effect of pensions on the economy as the elderly spent their extra money in local markets, shops, and public houses.
VI
The sources used in this article suggest that working-class responses to old age pensions are less intractable than usually supposed and that, by implication, other aspects of Edwardian interventionism, such as labour exchanges, are susceptible to close examination. Both contemporary fears about the deleterious effects of intervention and academic assumptions about state control of the elderly seem misplaced. Far from being intimidated by the pensions scheme, the elderly appear to have appreciated it and found it empowering. Rather than imposing a 'structured dependency' on the elderly, old age pensions placed constraints on the state itself in that the responsibility it had assumed in I908 could not easily be renounced and had, rather, to be extended. This was because, so far from being marginalized, the elderly found themselves propelled into the centre of political debate in 1910. The retention of their parliamentary vote enabled them to emerge as citizens more clearly than previously, a departure which had major ramifications in 1918 
